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Abstract
Purpose – CEOs’ (chief executive ofﬁcer) term of ofﬁce may explain discretionary accruals as a result of
opportunistic behavior arising during certain periods of the term of ofﬁce. Therefore, CEOs, in their early
years of ofﬁce, have incentives to report results that meet market expectations. In turn, CEOs in their senior
year may be motivated to use discretionary accruals to gain private beneﬁts. In this scenario, corporate
governance mechanisms play an important role in monitoring relationships. Hence, the purpose of this study
is to verify the inﬂuence of monitoring mechanisms on the relationship between CEOs’ term of ofﬁce and
discretionary accruals.
Design/methodology/approach – Descriptive statistics, multiple cross-sectional regression to estimate
the accruals and regression of panel data to test the hypotheses were used. The sample comprised 195
companies listed on BM&FBovespa.
Findings – The results indicated that CEOs’ long term of ofﬁce has a negative impact on the level of
discretionary accruals, and thus, Brazilian CEOs with a longer term of ofﬁce tend to establish a certain
reputation in the stock market. On the other hand, it is concluded that CEOs’ intentions, in the ﬁrst years of
term, are positively related to the use of accruals and that the monitoring mechanisms can minimize these
CEOs’ opportunistic practices.
Originality/value – The results broaden the literature on corporate governance, pointing that different
systems of variable remuneration may inﬂuence CEOs’ willingness to manage results in their last year of
term.
Keywords Discretionary accruals, CEOs’ term of ofﬁce, Corporative governance,
Result management
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The ﬁnancial scandals that led to the collapse of large corporations resulted, partly, from
opportunistic manipulation of accounting information. From this, questions emerged about
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the true effectiveness of the performance of corporate governance mechanisms, responsible
for protecting investors’ interests (Ebrahim, 2007).
The manipulation of accounting information has been studied from the perspective of
results management and associated with behavioral, political, economic and social factors.
Regarding managers’ behavior, it is understood that the practice of results management can
be intensiﬁed according to the CEOs’ term of ofﬁce (Brickley et al., 1999; Ali and Zhang,
2015), exemplifying agents’ opportunism and leading to agency conﬂicts (Healy and
Wahlen, 1999).
Hermalin andWeisbach (1998) and Ali and Zhang (2015) argue that, in the early years of
ofﬁce, the CEO’s opportunistic behavior is accentuated as the market is still assessing their
ability to generate proﬁtability for the organization. Unsatisfactory results lead CEOs to be
perceived as incompetent by stakeholders, inducing them to use discretionary
accumulations due to career concern (Graham et al., 2005). Aware of this judgment, CEOs
tend to exaggerate the presentation of favorable results to demonstrate their competence
(Holmstrom, 1982; Cella, Ellul and Gupta, 2014).
As for the end of the term, managers use discretionary accruals to report satisfactory
results, to increase their remuneration (Kalyta, 2009). Studies such as those by Dechow and
Sloan (1991), Pourciau (1993), Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) and Kalyta (2009) show that
the last year of the CEO’s term is the catalyst for opportunistic behavior, as in the case of
using practices of results management aimed at obtaining private beneﬁts.
Such weightings indicate that manipulation in accounting information can be explained
by behaviors derived from the term of ofﬁce the CEOs are due. At the beginning of the term,
they are motivated by career aspirations and reputation concerns and, in the ﬁnal period, by
the possibility of obtaining private beneﬁts from the bonuses linked to the results.
In this sense, to mitigate CEOs’ opportunistic behavior in speciﬁc periods of term of
ofﬁce, governance mechanisms are assigned the monitoring role to ensure the alignment of
stakeholders’ interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Governance efﬁciency is associated with
a combination of different mechanisms aimed at securing shareholders’ interests and
minimizing agency conﬂicts, such as: independence of the board of directors, presence of the
audit committee, independent auditing by Big Four and presence of institutional investors
(Stigler, 1961; Lam and Chang, 1994; Thomson and Davis, 1997, Bushee, 1998; Bratton and
Mccahery, 1999; Pinheiro, 2001; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Collins et al., 2003).
In this context, the motivation of the research lies in discussing the link between the
time horizon of the CEO’s term of ofﬁce and its relation to the capacity to develop
opportunistic attitudes. This is an important research area, as previous studies (Pourciau,
1993; Huson et al., 2012; Kuang et al., 2014; Ali and Zhang, 2015) do not privilege the
perspective of assigning to the elements (independence of the board of directors, presence
of the audit committee, independent auditors and institutional investors) the ability to
reduce CEOs’ opportunistic behavior. In view of the aforementioned gap, this article aims
to verify the inﬂuence of monitoring mechanisms on the relationship between CEO’s term
of ofﬁce and discretionary accruals.
The research ﬁndings point out that, in the ﬁrst years of their term, CEOs are more likely
to use opportunistic results management practices. On the other hand, there are indications
that CEOs with a long term of ofﬁce seek to preserve the reputation created over the course
of their careers, and for this reason, use less discretion in their accounting choices. In
addition, the application of the study in the Brazilian context may present new ﬁndings, as
the CEOs’ average term is shorter than that in other countries and the importance given by
CEOs to variable remuneration may be a preponderant factor for possible divergences.
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One of the contributions provides users of accounting information with an assessment of
newly appointed CEOs’ behavior or of that at the end of their term of ofﬁce, given their
ﬂexibility in accounting choices. By associating CEOs’ term of ofﬁce with their propensity to
manage results, the study also contributes, by favoring the stock market, to assessing the
quality of accounting information. For the literature, the contribution is linked to the effect of
the CEO’s reputation on results management, using the number of years of the term of ofﬁce
as a measurement criterion (Milbourn, 2003), and in this factor, the long term was
preponderant to the conclusion that the reputation contributed by the career surpasses the
CEOs’ opportunistic interests.
2. CEOs’ term of oﬃce and results management
The accounting information originates from the process of recognition, measurement and
disclosure (Lopes and Martins, 2005) . In scenarios with asymmetric information, there is a
risk that the accounting results disclosed by the CEOs are not consistent with the speciﬁc
economic, ﬁnancial and patrimonial reality of the organizations (Martinez, 2001).
In this way, managers can opportunistically exercise discretionary information about the
accounting information to report positive results that satisfy shareholders and exceed
market analysts’ expectations (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Given the above, discretionary
accumulation has been a widely used proxy for measuring the management of results
through accounting choices. Therefore, discretionary accumulations are used by managers
seeking to obtain ex post beneﬁts, with redistributive effects of proﬁts between the parties to
a contract (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).
The objectives of management accounting may be linked to the expectation of changes in
the manager’s image and/or in the business image, facing investors and themarket, interests
in dividend policies, capital requirements and/or remuneration related to proﬁts (Martinez,
2001).
In this sense, career concerns have been an incentive for the CEOs to use accounting
practices (Graham et al., 2005), and the term of ofﬁce period may be a preponderant factor,
especially in the early years, at the moment in which CEOs have their capacity evaluated by
the market (Deangelo, 1988; Pourciau, 1993; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012; Ali and Zhang,
2015). The last year in ofﬁce is also capable of eliciting opportunistic behavior by the CEOs,
as the absence of a future link with the organization may lead them to focus only on the
private beneﬁts derived from satisfactory accounting results (Dechow et al., 1995; Pourciau,
1993; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Kalyta, 2009).
The use of discretionary accumulations is a risky choice capable of generating an
opportunistic label for the CEO (Ali and Zhang, 2015). However, disclosure of bad results in
the ﬁrst few years of the term is also equally risky, classifying the CEO as incompetent and/
or incapable of generating satisfactory results for organizations (Hermalin and Weisbach,
1998). Thus, during the ﬁrst years of the CEOs’ term of ofﬁce, career concerns are raised,
generating motivations and behaviors capable of distorting accounting information in order
to extend the manager’s permanence in the corporate market (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995).
Ali and Zhang (2015) examined the CEO’s incentive to manage results during different
term periods. The results showed opportunistic behavior in the ﬁrst years of the ofﬁce term,
higher than in the last ones, being at a lower level in the companies with more adjusted
monitoringmechanisms.
Besides the use of opportunistic management at the beginning of the term of ofﬁce,
studies show that such practice is also used by CEOs to increase their income at the end of
the term (Kalyta, 2009). The management of results in the last year of term aims to increase
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earnings linked to proﬁts (Dechow et al., 1995; Pourciau, 1993; Murphy and Zimmerman,
1993; Kalyta, 2009).
Although they agree with the increased frequency of discretionary accruals in the ﬁrst
few years of CEOs’ term, some authors argue that the differences become insigniﬁcant after
the CEOs stay in charge for a long time (Diamond, 1989; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995, Cella
et al., 2013, Kuang et al., 2014). CEOs’ concerns about the career decline over the tenure and
shareholder’s uncertainty about their ability diminishes as information are revealed over
time (Holmstrom, 1982).
In general, in relation to discretionary accruals, the literature points out that there is
greater use of results management in companies whose CEOs are in the ﬁrst and last year of
their term. On the other hand, the lesser practice of results management can be associated
with CEOs who are in ofﬁce for a long term (minimum of ﬁve years). From these
perspectives, the hypotheses were established:
H1. CEOs’ attitude in the early years of their term is positively related to the increased
use of discretionary accruals.
H2. CEOs’ attitude in the last year of their term is positively related to increased use of
discretionary accruals.
H3. CEOs’ attitude over the long ofﬁce term is negatively related to increased use of
discretionary accruals.
H4. The shorter CEOs’ term of ofﬁce is positively related to the increased use of
discretionary accruals.
The next topic addresses the effect of monitoring mechanisms on the relationship between
CEOs’ term of ofﬁce and the practice of results management by discretionary accruals.
3. Mechanisms of corporate governance and the practice of results
management
Accounting information serves the purpose of monitoring and producing information that
supports the relationships between CEOs and shareholders (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).
Organizations with rigid corporate governance mechanisms report higher quality
information to shareholders and align managers’ interests with those of owners (Lopes and
Martins, 2005). Likewise, companies with deﬁciencies in monitoring mechanisms are more
likely to manage results (Dechow and Skinner, 2000).
Boards of directors and audit committees are some of the monitoring mechanisms used
to mitigate opportunistic behavior by CEOs. The ﬁrst is a deliberative body composed of
professionals elected by shareholders whose duties are related to the control and supervision
of managers (Bratton and Mccahery, 1999). The second one has the direct responsibility of
hiring, compensating and supervising the independent audit, as well as promoting the
resolution of conﬂicts between management and independent auditors, regarding the
disclosure of accounting reports (Furuta and Santos, 2010).
Goulart (2007) argues that companies with results management practices are more likely
to have no audit committees, and the board of directors is dominated by people associated
with the company. Thus, the presence of boards of directors and independent audit
committees is associated with the lowest level of results management (Klein, 2002).
To mitigate the effects of greater intensity in the use of discretionary accumulations by
the CEOs who are in the ﬁrst years of their term, in relation to those who are in the last year
in ofﬁce, the following hypotheses were established:
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H5. The greater independence of the board of directors negatively affects the
relationship between CEOs’ intention, in the early years and also in the long term,
with the intensity of accruals discretionary.
H6. The presence of the audit committee negatively affects the relationship between
CEOs’ intention, in the early years and also in the long term, with the intensity of
accruals discretionary.
Ali and Zhang (2015) indicate that management of results in the early years of CEOs’ term is
lower in companies with strong monitoring mechanisms. This way, the Big Four audits
disclose high-quality accounting information to the market (Stigler, 1961). The services
performed by large global audit corporations demonstrate a greater primacy over
accounting quality to the capital market (Lam and Chang, 1994). Likewise, corporate
governance mechanisms help CEOs who are in the long run to maintain their reputation
earned over the course of their careers, making the statements even better about the
disclosed information.
It is assumed that the Big Four have greater independence than other audit ﬁrms and
therefore would be more competent in monitoring and reducing informational asymmetry.
At the national level, Almeida and Almeida (2009) showed that Big Four audit ﬁrms are less
tolerant to results management, suggesting a better quality of the provided services. Based
on the above, the hypothesisH7 is presented:
H7. The audit performed by Big Four companies negatively affects the relationship
between CEOs’ intention, in the early years and also in the long term, with the
intensity of accruals discretionary.
Institutional investors also exercise monitoring power, being legal entities that compulsorily
invest part of their capital in the stock market, by governmental resolution, composing an
investment portfolio (Pinheiro, 2001). This way, such investors can assume the role of
owners with the means and motivations to pressure managers and boards (Thompson and
Davis, 1997), even reducing discretionary accumulations (Cornett et al., 2008).
Bushee (1998) and Collins et al. (2003) suggest that the presence of institutional investors
minimizes CEOs’ opportunistic behavior in their early years of ofﬁce. By focusing on long-
term results, institutional investors play a monitoring role over CEOs who sometimes have
short-term ﬁnancial intentions or goals (Healy andWahlen, 1999).
According to the previous arguments, Cella et al. (2014) concluded that results
management is frequent in companies with a lower intensity of institutional investors. Ali
and Zhang (2015) found that the practice of results management is lower in companies with
greater institutional participation. Thus,H8 of the study was established:
H8. The greater presence of institutional investors negatively affects the relationship
between CEOs’ intent, in the early years and also in the long term, with the intensity
of discretionary accruals.
4. Methodological procedures
4.1 Population and sample
The research population comprised the Brazilian publicly traded companies with data
available in the Economática® database and in the reference form. The sample was
delineated considering the companies that had the information to operationalize the
variables. Initially, companies that did not contain information on the regression models
that evidenced the dependent variable discretionary accruals were excluded. Subsequently,
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companies that did not contain information for the calculation of control variables were also
excluded, as well as those that did not provide information on the independent variables of
CEOs’ term of ofﬁce. The ﬁnal sample consisted of 195 companies. The period of analysis
included the years 2009 to 2013, totaling 975 observations.
4.2 Procedures for collecting and analyzing data
The partial adoption of international accounting standards by Brazilian companies was a
preponderant factor for the timing of the study, which began in 2008. Moreover, the study
comprised a period of ﬁve years, due to CEOs’ term of ofﬁce in Brazil (average of four years),
which is lower than the global average (5.3 years) (Strategy&, 2014).
Data collection was performed in two stages. First, collecting information related to
the calculation of discretionary accruals and control variables, based on ﬁnancial
information resulting from the ﬁnancial statements (equity at market value, leverage,
return on assets, loss, operating cash ﬂow, of the assets and size of the company),
obtained in Economática®.
Then, from the reference form of each company and with reference to all the studied
years, it was collected information related to the CEOs’ age and term of ofﬁce, institutional
investors, independence of the board of directors, presence of the audit committee and Big
Four auditing. To meet the objective of the study, it was necessary to calculate the accruals
variation in working capital, considered as a variable dependent on the Dechow and Dichev
(2002) model, adapted by Dechow et al. (2012), as follows:
DWCit ¼ DCAit  DCLit  DCashit þ DSTDitð Þ=Ait1 (1)
In which:
DCAit = change in current assets;
DCLit = change in current liabilities;
DCashit= change in cash;
DSTDit = change in short-term debt; and
Ait 1 = total assets at the end of t 1 period.
The next step was to establish the level of discretionary accruals by the variation of accruals
in working capital (DWCit), cash ﬂows for t  1 period, t period and t þ 1 period. For this,
the model of Dechow and Dichev (2002) was used, as follows:
DWCit ¼ a0 þ b 1 CFOt1ð Þ þ b 2 CFOtð Þ þ b 3 CFOtþ1ð Þ þ « t (2)
In which:
AD(GRit) = level of discretionary accruals obtained by the residuals of equation (2); and
CFO = operating cash ﬂow.
Then, the models used to verify the inﬂuence of the CEOs’ term of ofﬁce in the intensity of
discretionary accruals, according to the equations (3a)-(3d), were established.
AD GRð Þit ¼ a0 þ a1CEOPAMit þ a2CEOIdadeit þ a3PLVMit1
þ a4Alavancagemit1 þ a5ROAit1 þ a6Perdait1 þ a7CFOit
þ a8CrescAtivoit þ a9Tamit þ « it (3a)
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In which:
AD(GRit) = discretionary accumulations of ﬁrm i in year t, estimated by the residuals
of equation (3), in module; and
CEOPAMit = ﬁrst two years of CEO’s term, it is a dummy variable that equals one (1) for
the ﬁrst two years of CEO’s term and zero (0) otherwise.
Control variables:
CEOIdadeit = CEO’s age in year t; this variable was not established in Log because
Wooldridge (2006) comments that, generally, measured variables in
years do not take the logarithmic form;
PLVMit 1 = Log of shareholders’ equity at market value in the year t 1;
Alavancagemit 1 = total debt weighted by total assets in the year t 1;
ROAit 1 = return on assets in the year t 1;
Perdait 1 = dummy variable that equals one (1) for companies with net loss for
year t 1, and zero (0) otherwise;
CFOit = cash ﬂow from operations of year t, staggered by total assets at the
beginning of year t;
CrescAtivoit = change in total assets during year t, staggered by total assets at the
beginning of year t; and
Tamit = Log of total assets in year t.
AD GRð Þit ¼ a0 þ a1CEOFINALit þ a2CEOIdadeit þ a3PLVMit1
þ a4Alavancagemit1 þ a5ROAit1 þ a6Perdait1 þ a7CFOit
þ a8CrescAtivoit þ a9Tamit þ « it (3b)
In which:
CEOFINALit = dummy variable that equals one (1) for CEOs who are in the last year of
their term in year t and zero (0), otherwise.
AD GRð Þit ¼ a0 þ a1CEOLONGit þ a2CEOIdadeit þ a3PLVMit1
þ a4Alavancagemit1 þ a5ROAit1 þ a6Perdait1 þ a7CFOit
þ a8CrescAtivoit þ a9Tamit þ « it (3c)
In which:
CEOLONGit= dummy variable that equals one (1) for CEOs who are at least ﬁve years in
the term of ofﬁce in year t and zero (0), otherwise.
AD GRð Þit ¼ a0 þ a1TMCEOit þ a2CEOIdadeit þ a3PLVMit1
þ a4Alavancagemit1 þ a5ROAit1 þ a6Perdait1 þ a7CFOit
þ a8CrescAtivoit þ a9Tamit þ « it (3d)
In which:
TMCEOit = variable that considers the number of years of the CEO’s term of ofﬁce at
business i in year t.
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Finally, it was observed the effect of the monitoring mechanisms in the relationship between
the ﬁrst years and also the long term of the CEOs’ term of ofﬁce on the intensity of use of
discretionary accruals. To do so, the following equations were used:
ADit ¼ a0 þ a1CEOPAMit þ a2CEOPAM X IndConselhoADMit1
þ a3CEOIdadeit þ a4PLVMit1 þ a5Alavancagemit1
þ a6IndConselhoADMit1 þ a7ROAit1 þ a8Perdait1 þ a9CFOit
þ a10CrescAtivoit þ a11Tamþ « it (4a)
In which:
CEOPAM X IndConselhoADMit1 = variable that veriﬁes the effect of the independence
of the Board of Directors in year t 1, in relation to
the ﬁrst two years of CEOs’ term; and
IndConselhoADMit1 = independence of the board of directors in year t 1.
ADit ¼ a0 þ a1CEOLONGit þ a2CEOLONGX IndConselhoADMit1
þ a3CEOIdadeit þ a4PLVMit1 þ a5Alavancagemit1
þ a6IndConselhoADMit1 þ a7ROAit1 þ a8Perdait1
þ a9CFOit þ a10CrescAtivoit þ a11Tamþ « it (4b)
In which:
CEOLONGX IndConselhoADMit1 = variable that veriﬁes the effect of the independence
of the board of directors in year t 1, in relation to the CEOs’ long term:
ADit ¼ a0 þ a1CEOPAMit þ a2CEOPAM X PresenComit e^Audit1
þ a3CEOIdadeit þ a4PLVMit1 þ a5Alavancagemit1
þ a6PresenComit e^Audit1 þ a7ROAit1 þ a8Perdait1 þ a9CFOit
þ a10CrescAtivoit þ a11Tamit þ « it (5a)
In which:
CEOPAM X IndConselhoADMit1 = variable that veriﬁes the effect of the audit
committee in year t  1, in relation to the ﬁrst
two years of CEOs’ term: and
PresenComitêAudit1 = Presence of the Audit Committee in year t 1.
ADit ¼ a0 þ a1CEOLONGit þ a2CEOLONGX PresenComite^Audit1
þ a3CEOIdadeit þ a4PLVMit1 þ a5Alavancagemit1
þ a6PresenComite^Audit1 þ a7ROAit1 þ a8Perdait1
þ a9CFOit þ a10CrescAtivoit þ a11Tamit þ « it (5b)
In which:
CEOLONG X IndConselhoADMit1 = variable that veriﬁes the effect of the audit
committee in year t 1, in relation to the CEOs’
long term.
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ADit ¼ a0 þ a1CEOPAMit þ a2CEOPAM X AudBigFourit1 þ a3CEOIdadeit
þ a4PLVMit1 þ a5Alavancagemit1 þ a6AudBigFourit1 þ a7ROAit1
þ a8Perdait1 þ a9CFOit þ a10CrescAtivoit þ a11Tamit þ « it (6a)
In which:
CEOPAMX AudBigFourit 1 = variable that veriﬁes the effect of the Big Four audit in year
t 1, in relation to the ﬁrst two years of CEOs’ term; and
AudBigFourit1 = Big FourAuditing in year t 1.
ADit ¼ a0 þ a1CEOLONGit þ a2CEOLONGX AudBigFourit1 þ a3CEOIdadeit
þ a4PLVMit1 þ a5Alavancagemit1 þ a6AudBigFourit1 þ a7ROAit1
þ a8Perdait1 þ a9CFOit þ a10CrescAtivoit þ a11Tamit þ « it (6b)
In which:
CEOLONG X AudBigFourit1 = variable that veriﬁes the effect of the Big Four audit in
year t 1, in relation to the CEOs’ long term.
ADit ¼ a0 þ a1CEOPAMit þ a2CEOPAM X InstitucionalPropit1 þ a3CEOIdadeit
þ a4PLVMit1 þ a5Alavancagemit1 þ a6InstitucionalPropit1 þ a7ROAit1
þ a8Perdait1 þ a9CFOit þ a10CrescAtivoit þ a11Tamit þ « it (7a)
In which:
CEOPAM X InstitucionalPropit1 = variable that veriﬁes the effect of institutional
investors in year t  1, in relation to the ﬁrst two
years of CEOs’ term; and
InstitucionalPropit1 = percentage of shares held by institutional
investors in year t 1.
ADit ¼ a0 þ a1CEOLONGit þ a2CEOLONGX InstitucionalPropit1 þ a3CEOIdadeit
þ a4PLVMit1 þ a5Alavancagemit1 þ a6InstitucionalPropit1 þ a7ROAit1
þ a8Perdait1 þ a9CFOit þ a10CrescAtivoit þ a11Tamit þ « it (7b)
In which:
CEOLONG X InstitucionalPropit1 = variable that veriﬁes the effect of institutional investors
in year t 1, in relation to CEOs’ long term.
The analysis of the results was performed using descriptive statistics, cross-sectional
regression to estimate accruals [equation (2)] and regression of panel data to test the
hypotheses of the research [equations (3) to (7)].
5. Results analysis
This study sought to verify the intensity of use of discretionary accruals, but not the level of
positive or negative intensity of discretionary accruals. Thus, the variables AD(GRt) that
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had negative values were transformed by module, into positive values. In this sense, we
have the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the research, according to Table I.
It can be seen in Table I, in relation to term time, that 35 per cent of CEOs are in the ﬁrst
two years, totaling 345 observations. Long-term CEOs represent 33 per cent, totaling 326
observations, conﬁrming the estimate that many CEOs remain in the position for a longer
time than the ﬁrst few years of their appointment (Milbourn, 2003). CEOs in the last year of
their mandate represent 22 per cent of the sample, totaling 210 observations. Finally, the
CEOs of the Brazilian companies studied remain in the function (TMCEO), on average,
approximately 4.3 years, corroborating the estimate presented by Strategy& (2014), which
established that the Brazilian CEOs remain, on average, four years in the ofﬁce, less than the
overall average of approximately ﬁve years.
CEOs’ average age was 52.6 years (minimum 30 andmaximum 87). The average leverage
of the companies studied was 0.16 and the return on assets was 0.04. It is important to note
that 21 per cent of the companies presented losses in different periods, totaling 210
observations. Regarding the monitoring mechanisms, it can be observed that the average
proportion of institutional investors was 0.84 and the independence of the board of directors
was 0.17. In addition, 29 per cent of companies have an audit committee and 73 per cent are
audited by Big Four companies.
Finally, the sectors with the highest concentration of companies were: construction and
transportation (175 observations), public utility (170 observations) and cyclical consumption
(165 observations). On the other hand, the most representative sectors were: information
technology (25 observations), telecommunications (15 observations) and oil, gas and biofuels
(5 observations).
Table I.
Descriptive statistics
of the studied
variables
Variables N Minimum Maximum Average SD Total
AD(GRt) 975 0.00 1.60 0.08 0.11 80.48
CEOPAMit 975 0.00 1.00 0.35 0.48 345.00
CEOLONGit 975 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.47 326.00
CEOFINALit 975 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.41 210.00
TMCEOit 975 1.00 15.00 4.33 2.96 4328.00
CEOIdadeit 975 30.00 87.00 52.61 9.90 51295.00
PLVMit1 975 8.95 19.75 15.66 17.11 22.54
Alavancagemit1 975 0.00 0.79 0.16 0.12 151.25
ROAit1 975 0.82 0.75 0.04 0.10 36.09
Perdait1 975 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.41 202.00
CFOit 975 3.58 17.43 13.66 14.84 20.55
CrescAtivoit 975 0.88 3.38 0.16 0.34 154.13
Tamit 975 9.96 20.44 16.22 17.67 25.40
InstitucionalPropit1 975 0.00 53.00 0.84 4.66 370.00
IndConselhoADMit1 975 0.00 0.93 0.17 0.22 164.31
PresenComitêAudit1 975 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.45 280.00
AudBigFourit1 975 0.00 1.00 0.73 0.44 714.00
Notes: AD(GRit) = discretionary accumulations; CEOPAMit = ﬁrst two years of CEOs’ term; CEOFINALit =
CEOs who are in their last year of ofﬁce term; CEOLONGit = CEOs who have been in ofﬁce term for at least
ﬁve years; TMCEOit = number of years of CEO’s term; CEOIdadeit = CEO’s age; PLVMit1 = log of equity at
market value; Alavancagemit1 = total debt weighted by total assets; ROAit1 = return on assets; Perdait1 =
companies with net loss; CFOit = Cash ﬂow from operations; CrescAtivoit = growth of total assets; Tamit =
size by total assets; InstitucionalPropit1 = percentage of shares held by institutional investors;
IndConselhoADMit1 = Independence of the Board of Directors; PresenComitêAudit1 = Presence of the Audit
Committee; AudBigFouriit1 = Big FourAudit
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Table II shows the relationship between the assumptions of CEOs’ term time length and the
use of the discretionary accruals measured by equation (2).
It can be seen in Table II that all models presented a reasonable explanatory power for
the level of use of discretionary accruals, with an R2 of approximately 26 per cent. The
results show that CEOs’ ﬁrst years of ofﬁce term have a positive (signiﬁcant) relationship
with the use of discretionary accruals. Thus, indications point out that CEOs, in the ﬁrst
years of their term of ofﬁce, use [Gerenciamento de Resultados (Earnings Management)
(GR)] management practices more intensively and can sometimes seek, by means of such
practices, to demonstrate greater capacity to the market, which constantly monitors its
performance with regard to generating results for the organization. In this way, it is
considered that H1 is accepted, corroborating the evidences of Holmstrom (1982), Hermalin
andWeisbach (1998), Brickley et al. (1999), Cella et al. (2014), Ali and Zhang (2015).
In relation to CEOs in their last year of ofﬁce term (equation 3b), the results revealed that
there is no signiﬁcant effect on the level of discretionary accruals, rejecting H2, contrary to
the ﬁndings of Dechow and Sloan (1991), Pourciau (1993), Murphy and Zimmerman (1993),
Brickley et al. (1999), Kalyta (2009), Ali and Zhang (2015). Therefore, the evidence that CEOs
in the last year of their term have opportunistic interests tied to performance pay cannot be
proven and they would use GR opportunistic practices to do so.
In addition, important results are demonstrated in front of the observation of the CEOs
with long ofﬁce term. Thus, the evidence indicates that CEOs with a long term are
negatively related to the use of discretionary accruals, accepting H3 of the research. It is
concluded that CEOs with a long term of ofﬁce tend to use discretion (results management)
with less intensity, corroborating the inferences made by Diamond (1989), Kuang et al.
(2014), Cella et al. (2014), Ali and Zhang (2015), in which career concerns and shareholder
uncertainties about CEO capacity decline with the increase in term of ofﬁce, and thus, not
requiring the use of opportunistic practices when reporting accounting information.
Finally, the premise of the variable of time of ofﬁce term is presented by the equation
(3d). In this sense, the results demonstrate that CEOs’ time of ofﬁce term is negatively
related to the use of discretionary accruals, accepting H4 of the research. Therefore, it is
inferred that an increase in the CEOs’ term of ofﬁce leads to a decrease in the probability of
occurrence of the opportunistic practices, being the reverse also true, that is, the shorter
CEOs’ term causes an increase in the occurrence probability of GR. This result corroborates
the one found for the ﬁrst two years of ofﬁce [equation (3a)].
Table III shows the effect of monitoring mechanisms on the relationship between the ﬁrst
two years and the last year of CEOs’ termwith the intensity of discretionary accruals.
It can be seen in Table III that the models presented reasonable explanatory power for
the level of use of the discretionary accruals, with R2 close to 26 per cent. The results showed
that the presence of institutional investors negatively affects the relationship between CEOs
in the ﬁrst years of their term of ofﬁce and the intensity of use of discretionary accruals,
accepting H8 of the research. It is inferred, therefore, that the CEOs’ ﬁrst years of ofﬁce are
related to GR practices, although institutional investors act as mitigators of such
opportunistic practices, improving the quality of accounting information. Thus, the
evidences pointed by Thompson and Davis (1997), Bushee (1998), Collins et al. (2003),
Cornett et al. (2008), Cella et al. (2014), Ali and Zhang (2015) that institutional investors act to
minimize corporate opportunistic practices and, therefore, assist shareholders in corporate
monitoring, are conﬁrmed.
Regarding the independence of the board of directors, the ﬁndings show that this factor
negatively affects the relationship between CEOs in the ﬁrst years of their term of ofﬁce and
the intensity of use of discretionary accruals, accepting H5. This ﬁnding demonstrates that
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the independence of the board of management exercises a preponderant factor in mitigating
opportunistic practices, mainly, acting against companies with a tendency towards GR, as in
the case of those with CEOs in the ﬁrst years of their term. In addition, the ﬁnding
corroborates Klein’s (2002) and Goulart’s (2007) studies, in light of the evidence that the
board should be composed of independent members to be effective in corporate monitoring.
In addition, it is noted that the audit committee has negatively affected the relationship
between CEOs in the ﬁrst years of their term of ofﬁce and the intensity of use of
discretionary accruals, leading to the acceptance of H6. Thus, it is inferred that the audit
committee has effectively acted in corporate monitoring, especially in companies that are
more likely to use opportunistic practices, in this case when there are CEOs who are in their
ﬁrst years of ofﬁce term. This result corroborates Klein’s (2002) and Goulart’s (2007)
evidences on the performance of the audit committee as a mechanism of corporate
governance and also in its work toward improving the quality of accounting information.
Finally, it is noticed that the auditing of Big Four ﬁrm negatively affects the relationship
between CEOs in the ﬁrst years of their term of ofﬁce and the intensity of use of
discretionary accruals, which allows the acceptance of H7. In view of the above, it is
considered that the Big Four auditing has been a major factor in helping to improve the
quality of accounting information, even in companies that are prone to GR, as those with
CEOs who are in their ﬁrst years of ofﬁce term. The results converge with Stigler (1961),
Lam and Chang (1994) and Almeida and Almeida (2009), who demonstrated that the audit
by Big Four increases the quality of accounting information, acting as a mechanism that
improves corporate monitoring and making managers more concerned about the use of
opportunistic practices.
Based on the evidence presented in the international literature, it was hoped to conﬁrm
all hypotheses. However, inferences could not be made regarding CEOs’ long term in
Scenarios 5, 6, 7 and 8. In this sense, it can be concluded that CEOs’ long term management
is already a factor restricting GR opportunistic practices, and therefore, the inclusion of
corporate governance mechanisms does not improve the monitoring effect. Thus, it is
assumed that CEOs who have a long term are concerned with the quality of accounting
information reported to the market, which may directly interfere with the gain or loss in the
CEOs’ reputation.
In addition, panel data regressions were developed to test the moderating effect of
corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between TMCEO and GR practices
and also on the relationship between CEOFINAL and GR practices. The results showed that
the mechanisms of corporate governance do not bring signiﬁcant differences on the
relationships found in the models that evaluated the direct relationship between TMCEO
and GR practices and that between CEOFINAL and GR practices; therefore, it was decided
that such data will not be presented as they are not relevant to the results presented so far.
Regarding the control variables, the results were consistent with the tested models,
indicating that the CEOs’ age shows a negative and signiﬁcant relationship with the level of
discretionary accruals. Therefore, younger CEOs tend to use GR practices more intensively.
This result indicates the reputation factor as preponderant for non-use of opportunistic
practices, and there may be a tendency for older CEOs to have gained a reputation and
professional prestige and therefore would not be willing to engage in practices that may be
rejected or not well seen by themarket.
In addition, the models show that the degree of leverage is negatively related to the level
of discretionary accruals; therefore, more leveraged companies would be associated with a
lower use of discretionary accruals. In relation to return on assets, it can be inferred that this
is positively related to the level of discretionary accruals. In addition, organizations that
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present losses are more likely to use the discretionary power resulting from the accounting
choices. Companies with lower operating cash ﬂow also tend to use more discretionary
accruals and, lastly, those with higher asset growth and smaller size are positively related to
the use of discretionary accruals.
6. Discussion of ﬁndings
The results indicated that the level of discretionary accumulations is higher in ﬁrms with
CEOs in the ﬁrst years of their term, conﬁrming the ﬁndings of previous studies
(Holmstrom, 1982; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Brickley et al., 1999; Cella et al., 2014; Ali
and Zhang, 2015), which may indicate that such CEOs would be concerned about
demonstrating market competence and/or that they would seek to increase earnings linked
to results.
This result is also evidenced by the test of the time of CEOs’ term variable, whose
ﬁndings demonstrated a negative relation between term time and the use of discretionary
accruals, indicating that the shorter the term of CEOs, the better the results management
practices.
On the other hand, the level of discretionary accumulations is lower in ﬁrms where CEOs
are on a long term of ofﬁce, corroborating previous studies (Diamond, 1989; Kuang et al.,
2014; Cella et al., 2014; Ali and Zhang, 2015). The results, therefore, suggest that CEOs that
have a long term have a conservative attitude/intent to the intensity of discretionary
accruals, presuming they are concerned with a reputation built up over a career.
The results obtained in the tests of means was evidenced by the regressions, in which the
intention of the CEOs with long-term management is related negatively to the level of
discretionary accruals, inferring that Brazilian managers tend to use with less intensity of
discretion in the accounting choices. In this perspective, Cella et al. (2014) argue that CEO
compensation increases with term of ofﬁce time, and therefore, the results can prove the
lesser use of discretionary accumulations of CEOs with a long term of ofﬁce, reinforcing the
evidence that managers in that position are not concerned with remuneration associated
with reported results, but with the reputation they have built up over the course of their
career.
Based on the empirical evidence, it was possible to show that CEOs in the last year of
their ofﬁce term are not willing to manage results with higher remuneration prospects,
contrary to previous studies (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993;
Kalyta, 2009), in which CEOs in the last year of their term use discretionary accumulations
to inﬂate results, with the goal of earning higher pay.
The dissonance of results in relation to international studies, in relation to the last year of
the CEOs’ term, can be explained by the difference between the variable remuneration
system of Brazilian companies (more directed to proﬁt sharing) and that of other countries
(based on stock options), the former less likely to attract CEOs to the results management
exercise in their last year in ofﬁce, suggesting that reputation is more relevant than
compensation. These results are supported by Graham et al.’s (2005) suggestions that CEOs
are concerned with reputation and not with being labeled opportunists.
This result broadens the literature on the subject of international corporate governance,
noting that the different systems of variable remuneration adopted by countries may
inﬂuence CEOs’willingness to manage the results in their last year of ofﬁce term.
In relation to monitoring mechanisms, the results of the present study are consistent with
previous evidences (Thompson and Davis, 1997; Bushee, 1998; Collins et al., 2003; Cornett
et al., 2008) by indicating that the proportion of institutional investors, the independence of
the board of directors, the presence of the Big Four audit and audit committee have had a
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signiﬁcant impact on the decrease of discretionary accumulations in companies with CEOs
in the early years of their term. It is inferred, therefore, that the mistrust of the accounting
information reported by companies with CEOs in the ﬁrst years of their term can be
minimized through the use of such corporate governance mechanisms.
7. Conclusion and recommendations
The objective of the study was to verify the inﬂuence of monitoring mechanisms on the
relationship between CEOs’ term time and discretionary accruals. Predominantly, there are
indications that CEOs with a longer term of ofﬁce seek to preserve their reputation, created
over the course of their careers, and, therefore, use less discretionary choice in their
accounting choices. The control variable CEO’s age is a useful criterion for proving that,
over time, managers are more concerned with their reputation, as older CEOs use the
discretionary choice of accounting with less intensity. Having already demonstrated to the
market their managerial capacity, such CEOs prioritize the maintenance of a positive image,
while the younger ones need to outline positive results on their capacity, tending to use more
discretionary accruals.
CEOs, in the last year of their term, had no inﬂuence on the intensity of use of
discretionary accruals. It is suggested that the last year in ofﬁce, in the Brazilian context,
was not predominant to offer incentives to agency conﬂicts. Much of the literature related to
accounting choices focuses on the observation of CEOs in North American companies.
The performance-based pay culture seems to be more effective for the USA, whose
managers, in their last year in ofﬁce, are more likely to use discretionary accruals, differing
from Brazilian CEOs, according to the ﬁndings of this research. Finally, the average time of
ofﬁce term for Brazilian CEOs is lower than that for other countries’ CEOs, and may also be
a plausible explanation for divergent ﬁndings.
It is concluded that the CEOs in their ﬁrst years of ofﬁce are more likely to use
opportunistic results management practices. On the other hand, the mandate of CEOs’ who
have a long term has predominantly been that the quality of accounting information be
maintained and agency conﬂicts be reduced. In this sense, these results are relevant for
auditors, analysts, investors and shareholders to take greater care of companies that have a
high turnover of CEOs and tend to hire younger CEOs.
In general, the research succeeded in proposing to associate the time horizon of the CEO’s
mandate to the propensity to develop opportunistic attitudes and elements of monitoring,
research gap andmain motivation of the study.
For companies that have a tendency to use results management practices by CEOs in the
ﬁrst years of their term, it is useful to monitor the mechanisms of performance, minimizing
the impacts of opportunistic practices. In this sense, companies with high turnover of CEOs
need to establish strong mechanisms of corporate governance, using independent
management councils, creating audit committees, focusing on the presence of institutional
investors as shareholders and hiringBig Four audit ﬁrms.
The limitation of the ﬁndings of the ﬁrst years in ofﬁce is a function of the high turnover
of CEOs (stay in ofﬁce for a year or two). When participating in the sample, in the ﬁrst two
years and also in the last year of ofﬁce, this proﬁle, not controlled by the research, may have
generated temporal problems.
In addition, several models have been used extensively to test results management, with
admittedly limited effectiveness. The limitation of the Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model is
related to the low adequacy for results management tests in which the hypothesis implies
smoothing the results (Dechow et al., 2012). Still as a limitation, it is important to list that the
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results are indicative/associative and not causal, given the endogenous nature of the
relationships.
For future research, evaluations of the effect of CEOs’ time in ofﬁce on the management
of results by operational decisions are recommended. The results of research with this
perspective may support the premises established by Holmstrom (1982), Healy and Wahlen
(1999), Cella et al. (2014) and Ali and Zhang (2015), that CEOs in the early years of their term
tend to increase the practice of managing results. The same applies to CEOs in the last year
of their term of ofﬁce who, according to Kalyta (2009) and Ali and Zhang (2015), tend to
manage results in order to increase remuneration.
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